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Symbolic healing, that is, responding to meaningful experiences in positive
ways, can facilitate human healing. This process partly engages consciousness
and partly evades consciousness completely (sometimes it partakes of both
simultaneously). This paper, presented as the Society for the Anthropology of
Consciousness Distinguished Lecture at the 2011 AAA meeting in Montreal,
reviews recent research on what is ordinarily (and unfortunately) called the
“placebo effect.” The author makes the argument that language use should
change, and the relevant portions of what is often called the placebo effect
should be referred to as the “meaning response.”
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i n troduct ion
I’ve never been quite sure what “consciousness” was.
I think I get the idea of “conscious” (the adjective, not the noun), which
means something like “awake and aware.” It has some nice clear antonyms,
like unconscious, or subconscious, or preconscious. Got those. But “awake and
Anthropology of Consciousness, Vol. 23, Issue 2, pp. 192–210, ISSN 1053-4202, © 2012 by the
American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved
DOI: 10.1111/j.1556-3537.2012.01061.x
192
aware” seems to cover most of the world’s animal critters, if only in that they
try to escape danger and find prey or other stuff to eat. Surely apes and
monkeys, whales and dolphins, spiders and mosquitoes, and lots of others are
“awake and aware” to some degree. My vegan friends have all made this
point clearly enough that it would be hard for most of us to object even if
we do continue to prefer chicken salad to hay. And remember Darwin’s mas-
terful book, The Power of Movement in Plants (Darwin and Darwin 1880),
where he shows us a sleeping clover (perhaps unconscious; but then if, as
Darwin says, they are asleep, perchance to dream?) and an awake, aware,
and conscious clover. With alterity? Who knows.
But those are all adjectives. They all take some subject, like “mind” or
some other word I never use. Can you have a “subconscious soul”? Or can
you have a “conscious brain”? What other words can they modify? “Body”?
Can you have a conscious body? Or maybe leg? Can you have a conscious
knee?
I guess for me, “consciousness” means something more than conscious. To
have consciousness, you have to be—sort of—conscious of yourself, a sort of
metaconscious condition. Jensen and Overgaard (2011) asserted, “We, like sev-
eral others in this field of research, take the concept to mean subjective or
phenomenal experience.”
The more I think about it, the more conscious I seem to be. Whoa! I do
have a left leg! Not something I’d think about very often unless I had just
broken it or experienced “restless leg syndrome”—that is, if my leg were
acting on its own, not just mindlessly, or deliberately, walking me (well, half-
walking me) across the lawn or gone and I had some sort of “phantom limb
pain” where the leg, long lost as a casualty of war, felt itself to be wrapped
around my neck, trying to choke me to death. In all these cases, my leg is
sort of living a life of its own, even if it isn’t there. And damned if it isn’t liv-
ing its life inside of me! A sort of parasitical meta-leg. All this leads me to
think that consciousness is something better left unthought about. Let it
alone, or it might choke me to death with my own left leg.
So, here I am, an honored guest of the Society for the Anthropology of
Consciousness, suggesting that thinking about consciousness is generally a
bad idea. Regardless, I’m going to look at the role of consciousness in heal-
ing the sick. This will necessitate a look at a number of cases where it’s
pretty clear that while such healing occurs there is often no consciousness
involved at all.
In 1979, 33 years ago, I published a paper with the grandiose title “Anthro-
pology of Symbolic Healing” (Moerman 1979) In it, in fumbling fashion, I
tried to show that symbolic or meaningful experiences could directly affect
health or illness. As a broadly educated three-field anthropologist, this
seemed like a really interesting way to understand something about the
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character of human beings as symbolic, meaningful creatures and also as bio-
logical organisms, the product of millions of years of evolution.
The problem with this for my task tonight is that I generally think that
much of what goes on here involves, well, nonconsciousness. Let me give
you a few examples of the sort of thing I’m thinking about.
First let me recount for you a few details of a fascinating study carried out
a few years ago by neurologist and neuroscientist Fabrizio Benedetti
(Amanzio et al., 2001). Benedetti reported on an experiment where surgery
patients were treated with four different drugs appropriate to their conditions;
however, half the patients received their drugs openly, with an injection by a
figure 1 . open injection is more effective than hidden
injection of analgesic. pain scores after open injection are
shown by the lower lines; each graph indicates a different
analgesic (amanzio et al. , 2001) .
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clinician, while half received equivalent doses of the same drugs by hidden
infusion through an intravenous line. The results are shown in Figure 1.
Pain intensity is reported on the vertical axis, at 15-minute intervals shown
on the horizontal axis. Patients receiving the medication openly, who were
told they were about to receive it (the lower lines on the graphs), reported
more pain relief than those who received equivalent amounts of drugs
secretly (the upper lines in the graphs). Pain researcher Don Price, in an
accompanying editorial, described this study as “assessing placebo effects
without placebo groups” (Price 2001:202). As much as I respect Don Price,
this is an unfortunate use of language. There were no placebos here. So
obviously, there weren’t any “placebo effects.” What differentiated the sepa-
rate groups in this study were words.
Price did, however, recognize this: he noted that, although the increase in
pain relief in the study was probably not, by itself, clinically significant, “both
pain research scientists and the pharmaceutical industry go to the ends of the
earth to make improvements of this magnitude [to existing drugs]. Adding
one or two sentences to each pain treatment might help to produce them”
(Price 2001:201). Placebos are inert, but language is not! And, in this case,
since the event involves a conversation, it clearly has a cognitive, or con-
scious, dimension. Simply being aware that you are getting an analgesic
enhances its effectiveness.
Figure 2 represents the components of the human healing process. This
figure isn’t quite right since it suggests that meaning responses and drug
responses are independent and distinct. They aren’t. But I couldn’t quite fig-
ure out how to make the figure show that. The key thing is to indicate that
there are many factors besides drug effects that occur in any medical inter-
vention. Note that in Figure 2 I didn’t use the term “placebo effect.” Why? I
found the term to be imprecise, used by people to cover all sorts of odd
things, using it very different historically than in a contemporary context.
“The history of medicine is the history of the placebo effect until the
figure 2. components of the healing process.
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discovery of penicillin,” and so on. No two of the classic writers—Shapiro,
Frank, Beecher, and so forth–used the same understandings and definitions
for it; and I thought that historian Sissela Bok had forever ruined the term
when she equated it with deception, and damned it, quoting St. Augustine,
and arguing that, “little by little … and by gradual accessions [deception]
will slowly increase until in becomes such a mass of wicked lies that it will
be utterly impossible to find any means of resisting such a plague grown to
huge proportions through small additions” (Bok 1974:23).
Wow. This approach focused all attention on the “placebo” itself, privileg-
ing the deception in a pill that was inert. This had the effect of mystifying
what was going on—as, I’d argue, did reference to St. Augustine—fine for a
magic show, but not much good for science.
One of the biggest difficulties in all this follows from the confusion of what
is happening with the placebo treatment. Imagine that patients in some
mythical trial are given inert tablets called placebos. A week later they are dif-
ferent than at baseline; this difference is the “placebo effect.”
Of course, it’s not. Placebos are inert; they don’t do anything. That’s what
a placebo is—something inert. One reason people may be different is regres-
sion to the mean. Regression to the mean is not caused by placebos but by
study selection criteria. Placebos don’t cause changes due to natural history,
and they don’t cause conditioning. For conditioning to occur, you have to
train the subject with an active drug, one that has an unconditioned
response.
But it’s also the case that people can and do respond to language and
meaning. Benedetti has replicated his open/hidden drug experiment in three
other areas: diazepam in anxiety state, stimulation of the subthalmic nucleus
in Parkinson’s patients, and administration of beta-blocker (propranalol) and
muscarinic antagonists (atropine) in healthy volunteers (Benedetti et al.
2003). In all these cases, when the treatment was given openly, it was more
effective than when given secretly.
&
the mean ing res ponse
Given that there are no placebos anywhere in these experiments, it seems
unwise to call these responses “placebo effects.” And so I define the meaning
response as “the psychological or physiological effects of meaning in the
treatment of illness, and elsewhere.” Much of what is called the placebo
effect—the really interesting part—is meaning responses elicited with inert
medications or other treatments, or the evil twin of the meaning response,
that is, much of what is called the “nocebo effect” (Hahn 1997).
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I am interested particularly in the responses that people have to what
things mean or to what they know, to what others often call their expecta-
tions or expectancies. I don’t use these terms since they seem to me as an
anthropologist insensitive to culture; I anticipate before the fact that people
in different parts of the world with different cultural backgrounds will know
the world differently and might construct different meanings of apparently
similar objects or experiences. I would suggest that, more often than not,
expectancies are the outcome of a complex play of meanings. The two
approaches are not fundamentally different but have a different emphasis.
And note that in these cases of hidden/open administration we are dealing
with (at least in part) conscious processes. The people who know—are con-
scious of, are aware that—they are receiving treatment respond more than
those who don’t, those who only receive drugs.
It is also important to note that these matters, where meaning has an influ-
ence on health and even mortality, can occur well outside the ordinary
bounds of the clinic. Dr. David Phillips, a sociologist at UCSD, and
colleagues have shown that, in the presence of a broad range of diseases in
Chinese Americans in California, those who are understood by Chinese
traditions of astrology to be particularly susceptible to these conditions—by
virtue of the year of their birth—die significantly earlier than those with
the same conditions born in other years (Phillips et al. 2001). Here are two
examples that Phillips described.
Chinese with lymphatic cancer who are born in “earth years” (that is, years
ending with the numeral eight or nine like 2008 or 1949 and, consequently,
deemed by Chinese medical theory to be especially susceptible to diseases
involving lumps, nodules, or tumors) die (on average) four years sooner than
Chinese with lymphatic cancer born in other years. Those with lung diseases
born in “metal years” (years ending in the number zero or one—in Chinese
theory, “the lung is the organ of metal”)—die (on average) five years younger
(roughly 7% of length of life!) than those born in other years. There were no
such differences found in a similar examination of the mortality of thousands
of non-Chinese Californians. These are very compelling examples of “mean-
ing responses.” Throughout much of Asia, there is also a complex of mean-
ing regarding the number four. The Chinese word four and the Chinese
word for death sound a lot alike. Four is thereby an unlucky word in much
of Asia. Like the U.S. concern for the number 13, Asian hotels often don’t
have a fourth floor (or perhaps floors numbered 40–49). Phillips showed that
Chinese–Americans and Japanese–Americans were more likely to die on the
fourth day of the month than any other because four is an unlucky number;
however, if 13 is an unlucky number for Californians in general, it’s not
unlucky enough to increase the mortality rate (Phillips et al. 2001).
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At least some of the time, biological processes can be “activated,” or
perhaps “suppressed,” by that system of meanings we call culture, and we
may have no awareness of it at all. Although these effects occur widely in
human life, they are often most clearly and visibly displayed in the clinic.
People bring to their engagements with physicians many things; patients are
not blank slates. But one of the most powerful influences on patients is their
doctors. Dozens of studies have demonstrated this.
Physician attitudes can be conveyed to patients in extremely subtle and
delicate ways. Rick Gracely has described a phased experiment in which
dental patients about to have wisdom teeth removed were told they would
receive either placebo, naloxone, or fentanyl and that these might increase,
reduce, or do nothing for their pain. Subjects were all recruited from the
same patient stream, with consistent selection criteria by the same staff. In the
first phase of the study, clinicians (but not patients) were told fentanyl, a pow-
erful and fast acting narcotic, was not yet a possibility because of administra-
tive problems with the study protocol, yielding the PN group. In the second
phase, clinicians were told that now patients might indeed receive fentanyl,
yielding the PNF group (although in fact no one was ever treated with fenta-
nyl in the study). Placebo-treated patients during the first phase of the study
received no relief from it, and, after an hour, their pain reports increased sig-
nificantly. In the second phase of the study, placebo-treated patients experi-
enced significant pain reduction from their inert treatment. The only
apparent difference between the two groups was that the clinicians knew that
no one in the first would get fentanyl while the patients in the second group
might (although none represented in the figure actually did; they all received
only placebo). It is not at all clear how physicians elicited these effects from
their patients in a double blind trial. But they did (Gracely et al. 1985). Note
that while there was some deception in this study, those deceived were clini-
cians, not patients. In this study, patients were unaware of their clinician’s
knowledge, and their clinicians were unaware that they we influencing their
patients. It seems to me that in this case, it was only Rick Gracely who was
conscious of what was happening, and he never saw a single patient.
Clinician knowledge shapes drug experiences. This seems to be a fairly
broadly applicable principal that can be seen in a number of different con-
texts. It has been shown that old treatments become less effective as new
ones come along. It is, for example, a commonplace in medicine that one
should use drugs quickly before they lose their effectiveness. This quip has
been attributed to William Olser, among others. These data come from a
meta-analysis of treatment of ulcer disease. As shown in Figure 3, the healing
rates of drug groups in endoscopically controlled trials of two antisecretory
drugs are plotted by year of publication of the study (Moerman 2000).
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At least in the pre-Internet world of the 1970s and 1980s, it was doctors,
not patients, who knew what the hot new drug was. And, apparently, old
drugs become less effective as new ones come along.
Meaning responses occur throughout medicine, in surgery as well as in
internal medicine. A fascinating study showed the effects of inactive versus
active pacemakers in obstructive heart disease. Three months after installa-
tion of pacemakers, randomly activated or not, all patients were better than
at baseline. Shaded bars in Figure 4 show activated pacemakers; clear bars
show inactivated ones. Sham and active pacemaker patients were better on
most dimensions of the study: (from right to left on the figure) palpitations,
dizziness, shortness of breath, chest pain, self-perceived health, and so on.
While pacemakers worked better when they were turned on, they weren’t
much better; they certainly don’t seem to help “cognitive functioning” (Lin-
de et al. 1999). Everyone knew they had new pacemakers; no one knew if it
was turned on or not.
And, in a recent wrinkle in heart surgery called laser transmyocardial revas-
cularization [TMR], there are significant meaning responses as well. In this
procedure, lasers cut channels (sometimes called “bloodlines”) thru the wall
of the left ventricle, presumably to create the equivalent of new arteries.
I have emphasized the word “suggests” and “believed” in these texts but other-
wise not changed them at all. In a variation of this operation a laser catheter
is inserted in the femoral artery, guided into the left ventricle, and shoots
holes in the heart from the inside out. These surgical procedures are reserved
figure 3. old drugs become less effective as new ones come
along.
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for patients with the most severe and otherwise untreatable angina. In a quite
remarkable study, 300 patients with very serious angina were randomly
assigned to high dose, low dose, or no dose of TMR. At baseline, all patients
were rated as class III or IV on the Canadian Cardiology Society Angina Class
scale, a physician assessment that was the primary outcome of the study. Two
thirds of the patients improved two or more grades on the CCSS. Improve-
ment was substantial, and the same, after three and six months for patients
who received high dose, low dose, or no treatment with laser catheter inserted
but not fired (Leon et al. 2000). Disease perception was dramatically
improved, as were a broad range of other secondary outcome measures.
Alan Johnson made a prescient observation in 1994; “Electrical machines
have great appeal to patients [and doctors] and recently anything with the
word ‘laser’ attached to it has caught the imagination” (Johnson 1994:1141).
What we know, what we think, what we are led to believe, or what we
understand can have a significant effect in the context of medical care.
These things also happen in Complementary and Alternative Medicine
(CAM). A nice example involves acupuncture of point P6 on the inner wrist;
known in China as neiguan (nei means median, or central; guan means pass,
figure 4. improvements after implantation of pacemakers ,
active and inactive. the percentage difference from baseline in
quality of life parameters among patients assigned to inactive
and active pacing (linde et al. 1999) .
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as a pass between two mountain peaks, or tendons in this case). Traditionally,
needling this spot is understood to minimize nausea and vomiting, among
other things. A lot of research has been done on this point in order to try to
reduce: (1) postoperative vomiting and (2) nausea of pregnancy. The former
has been more successful than the latter. In 33 studies, the acupuncture was
done after anesthesis four times. Results? It didn’t work. In 29 studies, it was
done before anesthesia so the patient knew it was happening. Results? It
worked in 27 of the 29 studies (Vickers 1996). In this treatment, apparently
the patient must know that it has happened, be conscious of it, in order for
it to work.
Now, a caveat. While I believe that it is always prudent to imagine that
some substantial portion of every medical intervention includes some portion
of the meaning response, it isn’t always the case. One study shows a very
classic dose response rate: eight groups of patients were given increasing
doses of a statin, from 0 to 80 mg per day; the larger the dose, the more ldl
dropped. However, the group with 0 mg had no response. This is unusual,
and very interesting; it suggests that the liver operates in a way somehow
insulated from cognitive influence. Odd, but possible. What this also shows
is that we are dealing with a complex form of physiology here, not magic. If
it isn’t magic, what is it?
I would argue that it is at this point where we confront one of the biggest
and most interesting challenges in this whole arena; and I would suggest that
they are very big, very important, and very interesting challenges. Nobel
Prize-worthy challenges. One of the classic ways that people have dismissed
these matters in the past has been by saying, “Well, it’s all in your head.” It
turns out they are right, but not in the dismissive way they intended.
Parkinson’s disease has long been known by clinicians to be susceptible to
influence by inert treatments. Imaging studies by a group from British Colum-
bia have shown a neurological basis for this common clinical observation.
Figure 5 shows the increased occupancy of D2 receptors with dopamine in
the striatum after an injection of saline solution in a Parkinson’s patient; the
increased dopamine crowds out the radioactive dye. These effects are similar
in magnitude to the effect of amphetamine in healthy people; the authors
note elsewhere that an area of the nucleus accumbens is also susceptible to
the meaning response in Parkinson’s (de La Fuente-Fernanez et al. 2001).
So, it’s all in your head.
A similar case involves placebo and depression. Although the clinical
response of drug and placebo patients was, effectively, identical in this study,
drug response in brain activity was somewhat more general than placebo
response: “Active fluoxetine treatment was associated with additional and
unique changes in the brainstem, striatum and hippocampus” (Mayberg et al.
2002:730). This may help to account for why it is that, while placebo treatment
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of depression is often very nearly as effective as is treatment with SSRIs, there
is often substantially less evidence of unwanted side effects with placebo
(Leuchter et al. 2002).
&
var i a b i l i t y in the mean ing re s ponse
Given this, that it’s “all in your head” and that it involves language, it seems
reasonable to imagine that cultural factors—different ways of knowing the
world through language and meaning—will shape different responses to the
same “placebos” around the world. There is a great deal of variability in the
response to meaning in medicine, which I wish to look at briefly now.
Meaning responses are highly variable. If there is a single shibboleth in the
world of the effect of meaning or of placebos, it is that “placebo effects occur
about a third of the time.” I can’t address the history of this idea here, but I
can assure you that it is wrong. Figure 6 displays the four-week endoscopi-
cally verified healing rates in 126 control groups in trials of antisecretory
medications prescribed for peptic ulcer disease. They range from 0 to 100%
(Moerman 2000). Meaning responses can be extremely variable. I am
convinced that the study of this variability can be a key to developing a fun-
damental understanding of how meaning interacts with human biology.
A B
figure 5. placebo treatment reduces symptoms of parkinson ’s
disease: “the lower radioactivity observed in the striatum
after placebo (saline injection) reflects increased occupancy
of striatal d2 receptors [with dopamine] ( i .e . placebo induced
dopamine release)” (de la fuente-fernández et al. , 2002:88) .
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Such variability might be accounted for in many different ways. Color
makes a difference: changing the color of a pill can change its effects in a
variety of ways. In one particular case, a dozen or more studies have shown
that, in western nations, red pills tend to act as uppers/stimulants while blue
ones tend to act as downers/sedatives. Moreover, although they probably
don’t realize they are doing it, drug manufacturers tend to follow suit,
coloring their drugs to match these cultural expectations. DeCraen and his
colleagues did a study of 49 medicines available for sale in Holland that
affect the nervous system. They found that stimulant medications tend to be
marketed in red, orange, or yellow tablets, while depressants or tranquilizers
tend to be marketed in blue, green, or purple ones (de Craen et al. 1996).
There are some interesting exceptions to this pattern. In a series of
experiments in Italy, it was shown that blue sleeping tablets, or blue placebos
presented as sleeping tablets, worked better than did tablets of other colors—
but only for Italian women. In contrast, blue tablets tended to have a stimu-
lating effect on men! Checking with an Italian-American anthropologist
friend, we came up with this speculation: my friend explained that many Ital-
ian women have a special relationship with the Virgin, who is the protector
of women; the Virgin Mary is almost always shown in blue, and the relation-
ship to women seems to be particularly strong in Italy although it may be so
elsewhere as well.
What about men? Azzuri (blue) is the name (and the color) of the Italian
national football team. Blue, for many Italian men, is not a color of solace
but of excitement and stimulation, of joy and madness, of exhilaration and,
too often, of catastrophe. It’s hardly the color of sleep. (Let me note that I
have a certain sympathy for this proposition since a good translation of
figure 6. placebo group healing rates in 126 trials against
peptic ulcer disease range from 0% to 100% (moerman 2000) .
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“Forza Azzuri” chanted by Italian fans is “Go Blue,” the chant of the Univer-
sity of Michigan Wolverines who wear maize and blue colors while running
onto the field in Michigan Stadium in front of 110,000 screaming fans. Not a
soporific sight.)
But note as well that these matters are not simple and straightforward.
Consider the color of a very famous drug, Viagra. Viagra is almost always
shown as an oblong object, usually pointing upwards to the right. And it
seems always to be blue. In English, while blue has long had an association
with “low, down, depressed,” or with “having the blues,” it can also mean
mildly salacious, sexy, or sexually inappropriate, as in “blue movie.” The
OED quotes a dictionary of slang from 1864 indicating “Blue, said of talk that
is smutty or indecent” (Hotten 1870).
We are all, I suppose familiar with Picasso’s “blue period,” which lasted
from about 1901 to 1904, when many of his paintings were suffused in a gen-
eral blue color. Picasso was a young man, about 21, when he painted “Erotic
Scene” (which shows him receiving fellatio from a prostitute); his interest in
the erotic and his use of blue to frame it continued on for many years. In
1932 (when he was about 51), he painted “Nude, Green Leaves and Bust,”
which shows his mistress, Marie-Therese Walter, with leaves and a statue. It
also shows the same blue as in “Erotic Scene.” Art historians squabble about
what the blue in Picasso’s blue period means. Now you know. (Google these
paintings to see the colors; both are available in high quality images online.)
I’m also fond of a particular ad for Viagra in Arabic. It shows the standard
oval blue pill pointing to the upper right, with a line of text below. A literal
translation is something like, “Make a gubba out of a hubba.” A “hubba” is a
little seed, or grain, or pit. A “gubba” is a dome, as on a mosque. So, “make
a dome out of a pit,” or more colloquially, “Make a mountain out of a mole-
hill.” The details vary, but the sensibility is obvious. And, in Arabic, it
rhymes! And it’s blue. (If you are over 21, Google images “Viagra Arabic.”)
So, in complex, polysemic, cultural ways, colors can modify the effects of
medication. So can the form of medication. For example, Ton de Craen has
shown that injected placebo is more effective than oral placebo in the treat-
ment of migraine headache (de Craen et al. 2000). When the drug sumitrip-
tan (known in the United States as Imitrex, and as Imgran elsewhere) was
first introduced, it was only available in the form of an injection; today it is
still available that way but also as tablets and nasal spray. De Craen did a
meta-analysis of 35 trials. In placebo-treated patients, among those treated
with a pill taken by mouth, after two hours 26% of patients reported that
their headache was better (it was gone, or mild). Of those treated with a
placebo injection, 32% of patients were better. This difference is small (about
6%) but it is statistically significant (v2 = 9.4, p = .002). In studies like this,
no one involved, from funder to subject, has any idea at all that factors like
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this are in play; they are utterly out of consciousness. We will come back to
this example in a moment, but from a different direction.
So, color and form can make a difference, and so, too, the number of pills
taken can make a difference. In a very subtle meta-analysis, De Craen
showed that, in some 80 studies of several antisecretory medications for duo-
denal ulcer, there was a significant difference in the endoscopically verified
healing rates for those who took two placebos per day (36%) compared to
those who took four placebos per day (44%), a difference of 8%. Everyone
knows that 4 > 2, but who knew this?
Finally, for the anthropologists, cultural factors can make a difference.
There are also cultural factors, which are associated with some variation (in
addition to color!). In addition to the Italian difference with respect to
“blue,” there are other cultural differences in the meaning response. Recall
the study of inert injection versus inert tablet for migraine where shots
worked better than pills. The bars on the left in Figure 7 represent the num-
bers I mentioned earlier for injected versus tablet for Imipramine. However,
in studies that were carried out in the United States, the same pattern
appeared: 22% oral versus 34% subcutaneous placebo relief rate. In studies
done in Europe, however, the difference disappeared: 27% oral versus 25%
subcutaneous placebo relief rate (de Craen et al. 2000:186). Injections work
better than pills, but only in the USA. There are cultural differences shaping
the placebo effect. In my work with peptic ulcers, the mean placebo healing
rate (again, four-week, endoscopically controlled) in six German studies is
59%; the rate in three Brazilian studies is about 7%. Perhaps Brazilians and
Germans have fundamentally different kinds of ulcers (although this seems
doubtful). Comparing the six German studies to five studies from Germany’s
figure 7. inert injection is more effective than inert tablet
for migraine, but only in the north america, not europe.
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northern low-country neighbors in Denmark and the Netherlands, the Ger-
man placebo healing rate is 59% compared to the Danish/Dutch rate of 22%.
Note that the situation is not a simple one and that these differences seem to
vary by illness: the control group healing rates in treating hypertension are
lower in Germany than in other Western nations. These are not generic
cultural factors but seem to involve specific cultural conceptualizations,
understandings, or constructions of illness in different cultures, which seem
to have a real impact on health and healing.
Finally, it seems as if, sometimes, there are historical factors that can shape
these forces. Indeed, these kinds of differences can be seen not only between
different cultures but through time as attitudes and understandings change.
Walsh and colleagues (2002) reviewed 75 trials of various antidepressants: tri-
cyclics (like Elavil and Tofranil) and SSRIs (like Prozac and Zoloft) com-
pared with placebo. The effectiveness of drug treatment for depression has
trended up substantially between 1981 and 2000, so that the proportion of
patients responding to tricyclic antidepressants and to SSRIs had increased
from about 40% to about 55%. Over the same period, the proportion of
patients responding to placebo increased from about 20% to about 35%. The
proportion responding was strongly correlated with the year of publication of
the study for both drug and placebo treatment. The authors concluded that,
“Some factor or factors associated with the level of placebo response must
therefore have changed significantly during this period. Unfortunately, we
were not able to identify these factors” (Walsh et al., 2002:1844).
However, the matter doesn’t seem too complicated to me. Over the past
generation, there has been a clear shift in consciousness among doctors,
patients, friends, and, generally, everyone, to the effect that depression can
be treated with drugs. This was simply not the case (or at least not broadly
shared) 20 or 25 years ago. As recently as 1970, for example, Goodman and
Gilman’s Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics, one of the standard refer-
ence sources was clearly more enthusiastic about electro-convulsive therapy
(ECT) than it was about treatment with imipramine or amitriptyline, which
were said never to be more effective than ECT (Goodman & Gilman,
1970:186–192). Today, while we practically never hear of ECT, we all “know”
that drugs are effective for depression; we read it in the newspapers, in the
scientific journals, we see it on TV dramas, and, in the US at least, we see it
in drug company advertisements everywhere, both in professional media and
on TV commercials, and, of course, in our spam e-mail.
Antidepressant drugs are available in the drugstore and, in the form of St.
John’s Wort, at the OTC drug section of your local supermarket. As we
change our views of the effectiveness of drugs, their effectiveness changes, as
do their placebo mimics in trials. Meanings change and so do meaning
responses. I have never been able to figure out just how much the pharma-
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ceutical industry spends on advertising, but it is said to be about the same
as, or more than, the amount spent on research. Most of this advertising is
directed to physicians, but in the United States and New Zealand, what is
called “DTC; Direct To Consumer” advertising is legal; it’s unlikely that this
can’t have some effect on perceptions and understandings of people
regarding particular drugs or drugs in general, and it is certainly possible that
it is enhancing the general understand people have of how effective drugs
must be.
Table 1 seems an interesting proxy for this advertising. It is a list of some
recent fines paid for illegal advertising to physicians of unapproved uses of
drugs (sum of the four amounts is $4.7 billion dollars). The money spent on
drug promotion is enormous. And it probably has effects well beyond what
the drug companies intend. It would be among the richest of ironies if drug
company advertising were responsible for such an increase in the meaning
response that the companies could no longer show their new drugs to be
superior to placebo!
&
conclu s ion s
What we know, understand, think, and feel; what we are told and believe;
our cultural background; the TV and sports cultures we know; the newspa-
pers and magazines we read; the relationships we have with our clinicians
(our doctors, residents, interns, nurses, aids, orderlies, and probably reception-
ists and parking lot attendants), our families (our moms and dads, siblings,
cousins, spouses, children, especially grandchildren), and our friends (jogging
or fishing companions, drinking buddies, knitting clubs, coffee club pals) can
table 1 . a cost of doing business. fines paid to the fda for
advertising to doctors for unapproved (off-label) uses of
drugs (wilson 2010) .
(author's note: on july 2, the justice department announced a $3
billion fine against glaxosmithkline for illegal advertising
for paxil, welbutrin, avandia and ' 'other drugs' ' . the article
mentions in passing that abbott labs settled for $1 .6 billion
for illegal marketing of depakote in may; and an agreement
pending with johnson and johnson could result in a fine of as
much as $2 billion for illegal marketing of risperdal.http: / /
www.nyt imes .com/2012 /07/03/business /g laxosmithkl ine -agrees - to -pay -
3 -bi l l ion- in- f raud-set t lement .html?_r=1)
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very directly or, maybe, more often indirectly, affect our responses to medi-
cines, inert or otherwise. Some of this is conscious and clearly the result of
cognitive interactions; much of it is not at all conscious and is completely off
our ordinary radar. These matters are, these days, largely left to chance, or to
ideology, or to market forces, but are rarely subject to robust science,
although that’s less true today, thankfully, than it was a decade ago. The
clinical, analytical, and scientific implications of these matters are clearly rich
and full and virtually unexamined.
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